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Abstract
Dynamic Data-Driven Avionics Systems (DDDAS) embody ideas from the Dynamic Data-
Driven Application Systems paradigm by creating a data-driven feedback loop that analyzes
spatio-temporal data streams coming from aircraft sensors and instruments, looks for errors
in the data signaling potential failure modes, and corrects for erroneous data when possible.
In case of emergency, DDDAS need to provide enough information about the failure to pilots
to support their decision making in real-time. We have developed the PILOTS system, which
supports data-error tolerant spatio-temporal stream processing, as an initial step to realize the
concept of DDDAS. In this paper, we apply the PILOTS system to actual data from the Tuninter
1153 (TU1153) ﬂight accident in August 2005, where the installation of an incorrect fuel sensor
led to a fatal accident. The underweight condition suggesting an incorrect fuel indication for
TU1153 is successfully detected with 100% accuracy during cruise ﬂight phases. Adding logical
redundancy to avionics through a dynamic data-driven approach can signiﬁcantly improve the
safety of ﬂight.
Keywords: programming models, spatio-temporal data, data streaming
1 Introduction
Dynamic Data-Driven Avionics Systems (DDDAS) based on the concept of Dynamic Data-
Driven Application Systems [1] use sensor data in real-time to enrich computational models
in order to more accurately predict aircraft performance under partial failures. DDDAS can
therefore support better-informed decision making for pilots and can also be applicable to
autonomous unmanned air and space vehicles. As a ﬁrst step towards realizing DDDAS, we have
developed a system called PILOTS (ProgrammIng Language for spatiO-Temporal Streaming
applications) [2, 3, 4] that enables specifying error detection and data correction in spatio-
temporal data streams using a highly-declarative programming language. Figure 1 shows a
conceptual view of DDDAS. Upon a request from the Avionics Application, the Pre-Processor
takes raw data streams from aircraft sensors and then produces homogeneous and corrected
streams. Following data pre-processing, the Avionics Application can constantly compute its
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desired output with the corrected data. Since the Avionics Application controls the aircraft
ultimately based on the raw data streams from the sensors, we can see that understanding data
errors to detect potential sensor and instrument failures can signiﬁcantly augment the envelope
of operations of autonomous ﬂight systems.
Figure 1: Conceptual view of Dynamic Data-Driven Avionics Systems
PILOTS has been successfully applied to detect the airspeed sensors failure which occurred
in the Air France ﬂight 447 accident from its recovered black box data [5]. In this paper, we
analyze the TU1153 ﬂight [6], where the installation of an incorrect fuel sensor led to a fatal
accident. In the AF447 case, we used the relationship between airspeed, ground speed, and
wind speed data to infer the pitot tubes failure. In the TU1153 case, we use the relationship
between fuel weight, and aircraft performance (airspeed) data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes error signature-based
error detection and correction methods as well as the PILOTS programming language and the
architecture of its runtime system. Section 3 discusses the design of error signatures and results
of error detection performance for the TU1153 ﬂight data, and Section 4 describes related
work. Finally, we brieﬂy describe future research directions for real-time error-tolerant stream
processing and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Error-Tolerant Spatio-Temporal Data Streaming
2.1 Error Detection and Correction Methods
Error functions An error function is an arbitrary function that computes a numerical value
from independently measured input data. It is used to examine the validity of redundant data.
If the value of an error function is zero, we normally interpret it as no error in the given data.
The relationship between ground speed (ÝÑvg), airspeed (ÝÑva), and wind speed (ÝÑvw) shown in
Equation 1 is visually depicted in Figure 2.
ÝÑvg “ ÝÑva ` ÝÑvw. (1)
A vector ÝÑv can be deﬁned by a tuple pv, αq, where v is the magnitude of ÝÑv and α is the
angle between ÝÑv and a base vector. Following this expression, ÝÑvg ,ÝÑva, and ÝÑvw are deﬁned as
pvg, αgq, pva, αaq, and pvw, αwq respectively. We can compute ÝÑvg by applying trigonometry to
ABC and deﬁne an error function as the diﬀerence between measured vg and computed vg
as follows:
epÝÑvg ,ÝÑva,ÝÑvwq “ |ÝÑvg ´ pÝÑva ` ÝÑvwq| “ vg ´
a
v2a ` 2vavw cospαa ´ αwq ` v2w. (2)
The values of input data are assumed to be sampled periodically from corresponding spatio-
temporal data streams. Thus, an error function e changes its value as time proceeds and can
also be represented as eptq.
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Figure 2: Trigonometry applied to the
ground speed, airspeed, and wind speed.
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Figure 3: Error signature SI with a linear
function fptq “ t ` k, 2 ď k ď 5.
Error signatures An error signature is a constrained mathematical function pattern that
is used to capture the characteristics of an error function eptq. Using a vector of constants
K¯ “ xk1, . . . , kmy, a function fpt, K¯q, and a set of constraint predicates P¯ “ tp1pK¯q, . . . , plpK¯qu,
the error signature SpK¯, fpt, K¯q, P¯ pK¯qq is deﬁned as follows:
Spfpt, K¯q, P¯ pK¯qq ﬁ t f | p1pK¯q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ plpK¯qu. (3)
For example, an interval error signature SI can be deﬁned as SI “ Spfpt, K¯q, I¯pK¯, A¯, B¯qq “
t f | a1 ď k1 ď b1, . . . , am ď km ď bmu, where A¯ “ xa1, . . . , amy and B¯ “ xb1, . . . , bmy. When
fpt, K¯q “ t ` k, K¯ “ xky, A¯ “ x2y, and B¯ “ x5y, the error signature SI contains all linear
functions with slope 1, and crossing the Y-axis at values r2, 5s as shown in Figure 3.
Mode likelihood vectors Given a vector of error signatures xS0, . . . , Sny, we calculate
δipSi, tq, the distance between the measured error function eptq and each error signature Si by:
δipSi, tq “ min
gptqPSi
ż t
t´ω
|eptq ´ gptq|dt. (4)
where ω is the window size. Note that our convention is to capture “normal” conditions as
signature S0. The smaller the distance δi, the closer the raw data is to the theoretical signature
Si. We deﬁne the mode likelihood vector as Lptq “ xl0ptq, l1ptq, . . . , lnptqy where each liptq is:
liptq “
#
1, if δiptq “ 0
mintδ0ptq,...,δnptqu
δiptq , otherwise.
(5)
Mode estimation Using the mode likelihood vector, the ﬁnal mode output is estimated as
follows. Observe that for each li P L, 0 ă li ď 1 where li represents the ratio of the likelihood
of signature Si being matched with respect to the likelihood of the best signature. Because of
the way Lptq is created, the largest element lj will always be equal to 1. Given a threshold
τ P p0, 1q, we check for one likely candidate lj that is suﬃciently more likely than its successor
lk by ensuring that lk ď τ . Thus, we determine j to be the correct mode by choosing the most
likely error signature Sj . If j “ 0 then the system is in normal mode. If lk ą τ , then regardless
of the value of k, unknown error mode (´1) is assumed.
Error correction Whether or not a known error mode i is recoverable is problem depen-
dent. If there is a mathematical relationship between an erroneous value and other indepen-
dently measured values, the erroneous value can be replaced by a new value computed from the
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other independently measured values. In the case of the speed example used in Equations 1
and 2, if the ground speed vg is detected as erroneous, its corrected value vˆg can be computed
by the airspeed and wind speed as vˆg “
a
v2a ` 2vavw cospαa ´ αwq ` v2w.
2.2 Spatio-Temporal Data Stream Processing System
2.2.1 System Architecture
Figure 4 shows the architecture of the PILOTS runtime system, which implements the error
detection and correction methods described in Section 2.1. It consists of three parts: the Data
Selection, the Error Analyzer, and the Application Model modules. The Application Model
obtains homogeneous data streams pd11, d12, . . . , d1N q from the Data Selection module, and then it
generates outputs (o1, o2, . . . , oM ) and data errors (e1, e2, . . . , eL). The Data Selection module
takes heterogeneous incoming data streams (d1, d2, . . . , dN ) as inputs. Since this runtime is
assumed to be working on moving objects, the Data Selection module is aware of the current
location and time. Thus, it returns appropriate values to the Application Model by selecting or
interpolating data in time and location, depending on the data selection method speciﬁed in the
PILOTS program. The Error Analyzer collects the latest ω error values from the Application
Model and keeps analyzing errors based on the error signatures. If it detects a recoverable
error, then it replaces an erroneous input with the corrected one by applying a corresponding
error correction equation. The Application Model computes the outputs based on the corrected
inputs produced from the Error Analyzer.
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Figure 4: Architecture of the PILOTS runtime system.
2.2.2 PILOTS Programming Language
PILOTS is a programming language speciﬁcally designed for analyzing spatio-temporal data
streams, which potentially contain erroneous data. Compiled PILOTS programs are designed
to run on the runtime system described in Section 2.2.1. Using PILOTS, developers can eas-
ily program an application that handles spatio-temporal data streams by writing a high-level
(declarative) program speciﬁcation.
PILOTS application programs must contain inputs and outputs sections. The inputs
section speciﬁes the incoming data streams and how data is to be extrapolated from incomplete
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data, typically using declarative geometric criteria (e.g., closest, interpolate, euclidean
keywords). Note that these extrapolations are performed based on the current location and
time of the PILOTS system. The outputs section speciﬁes outgoing data streams to be pro-
duced by the application, as a function of the input streams with a given frequency. errors
and signatures sections are optional and can be used to detect errors. Similar to the outputs
section, the errors section speciﬁes an error stream to be produced by the application and
to be analyzed by the runtime system to recognize known error patterns as described in the
signatures section. If a detected error is recoverable, output values are computed from cor-
rected input data using correction formulas under the correct section (See Figure 7 for an
actual PILOTS program example).
3 Analyzing Tuninter 1153 Flight Data
Tuninter 1153 ﬂight (TU1153) was a ﬂight from Bari, Italy to Djerba, Tunisia on August 6th,
2005. About an hour after departure, the ATR 72 aircraft ditched into the Mediterranean Sea
due to exhaustion of its fuel, killing 16 of 39 people on board (see Figure 5 for the altitude
transition from the accident report [6]). The accident was caused by the installation of an
incorrect fuel quantity indicator. That is, a fuel quantity indicator for the smaller ATR 42 was
mistakenly installed, reporting 2150 kg more fuel than actually available. We call this incorrect
indicated weight ﬁctitious weight following the accident report.
How could DDDAS have prevented this accident from happening? If all other conditions
are the same between two ﬂights except for the weight, the one with lighter weight would have
a higher airspeed. If we could compute expected airspeed from the monitored weight, we can
compare the expected and monitored airspeed to detect if there is a discrepancy between the
two. Once the system detects the discrepancy, it can warn pilots in an early stage of the ﬂight
to prevent the accident. Using this idea, we design a set of error signatures and evaluate it with
actual data recorded in the ﬂight data recorder (black box) during the TU1153 ﬂight.
3.1 Error Signatures Design
In the ATR 72 ﬂight crew operating manual [7], there are tables for pilots to estimate cruise
airspeed (knots) under certain conditions of engine power settings, temperature diﬀerence to
the International Standard Atmosphere ( ˝C), ﬂight level (feet), and weight (kg) of the aircraft,
which are denoted by va, tΔ, h, and w respectively. According to the accident report, tΔ “ `10
is a reasonable approximation at the time of the accident. By using polynomial regression, we
Figure 5: Altitude transition of the
TU1153 ﬂight.
Figure 6: Calibration of the error function
by the ﬁrst cruise phase.
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can derive a formula for the estimated airspeed vˆa as follows:
vˆa “ zT ¨ k “
»
——————–
1
w
h
w ¨ h
w2
h2
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
T
¨
»
——————–
6.4869E ` 01
1.4316E ´ 02
6.6730E ´ 03
´3.7716E ´ 07
´2.4208E ´ 07
´1.1730E ´ 07
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
(6)
Using Equation 6, the error function is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the monitored (va)
and estimated (vˆa) airspeed:
epva, w, hq “ va ´ vˆa (7)
Figure 6 shows how the error function behaves for the ﬁrst cruise phase from 2170 to 2370
seconds of the ﬂight (see Figure 5 for the two cruise phases observed in the ﬂight) using actual
weight. As we can see from the original error plot, error values range from around -4 to -1.5
knots. This is expected because there are variables that are not considered in Equation 6 such
as angle of attack, center of gravity, and aircraft tear and wear. To improve the overall ﬁtness
of the error function to the TU1153 data, we can “calibrate” the error function by adding a
constant. In Equation 8, CP1 is a set of data points during the ﬁrst cruise phase and N is the
number of data points in CP1 (i.e., N “ |CP1|). This equation is meant to ﬁnd a constant
that minimizes the squared diﬀerence between the error function and the constant itself. By
subtracting the value of Kcalib “ ´2.59 from Equation 7, we get a new calibrated error function
ecalib “ e ´ Kcalib as shown in the dotted-line of Figure 6.
Kcalib “ argmin
k
1
N
Nÿ
iPCP1
‖ ei ´ k ‖2“ 1
N
Nÿ
iPCP1
ei (8)
Since the error function is adjusted to be zero after calibration, naturally we use the error
value of zero with small margins to identify a normal condition. For underweight conditions,
we set a constraint that will identify 10% discrepancy in weight regardless of the value of τ .
Since the 10% weight diﬀerence leads to a 4.69 knots diﬀerence in airspeed using Equation 6
(computed by averaging over w “ 13000 „ 22000 kg at h “ 23000 feet), we use 4.69 as the
boundary for the underweight conditions. Note that from Equation 6, the estimated airspeed
vˆa monotonically decreases as the weight w increases for ﬁxed h and tΔ. Since cruise ﬂights
keep the same altitude, the error should be positive in underweight conditions as occurred in
the TU1153 ﬂight. In summary, we derive the error signature set shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Error signatures for the Tuninter 1153 ﬂight.
Mode Error Signature
Function Constraints
Normal e “ k ´2 ă k ă 2
Underweight e “ k 4.69 ă k
Note that this error signature set is not generally applicable, but speciﬁcally adjusted for
the ﬁrst cruise phase of the TU1153 ﬂight. In a real-world application, we would use more data
sets to derive a general error signature set for ATR 72 aircraft; however, we do not have access
to actual ATR 72 ﬂight data including airspeed, weight, altitude, and temperature. Therefore,
we create a model for the cruise phases, adjust it to the ﬁrst cruise phase, and evaluate it with
the second cruise phase.
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3.2 PILOTS Program
A PILOTS program called WeightCheck implementing the error signature set of Table 1 is
presented in Figure 7. This program tries to detect an underweight condition by comparing the
monitored airspeed and estimated airspeed computed from the weight and altitude. Once the
program detects the underweight condition by the error signature S1, it estimates the corrected
weight wˆ by Equation 9, assuming airspeed, altitude, and temperature diﬀerence are all correct.
This equation is obtained by solving Equation 6 for w after the calibration (i.e., adding Kcalib
to the right-hand side of the equation).
wˆ “ ´b ´
?
b2 ´ 4ac
2a
, (9)
where a “ kp5q, b “ kp2q ` kp4q ¨ h,
c “ kp1q ` kp3q ` kp6q ¨ h2 ´ va ` Kcalib.



program WeightCheck;
/* v_a: airspeed , w: weight , h: altitude */
inputs
v_a , w, h(t) using closest(t);
outputs
corrected_w: w at every 10 sec;
errors
e: v_a - (6.4869E+01 + 1.4316E-02 * w + 6.6730E-03 * h + ( -3.7716E-07) * w * h +
( -2.4208E-07) * w * w + ( -1.1730E-07) * h * h) + 2.59;
signatures
S0(K): e = K, -2 < K, K < 2 "Normal";
S1(K): e = K, 4.69 < K " Underweight ";
correct
S1: w = 3.34523E-12 * (sqrt (1.09278E+22 * h * h + ( -1.65342E+27) * h +
( -3.69137E+29) * v_a + 1.01119E+32) - 2.32868E+11 * h +
8.83906E+15);
end
Figure 7: A declarative speciﬁcation of the WeightCheck PILOTS program.
3.3 Evaluation
Flight Data: The airspeed, ﬁctitious fuel weight, and altitude of the aircraft are collected from
Attachment H of the accident report [6]. Since we need the total weight of the aircraft for our
model to work, we compute it by adding the fuel weight to the zero fuel weight of the aircraft.
As a result, before the departure, the ﬁctitious weight of the aircraft is 19420 kg whereas the
real weight is 17270 kg.
Evaluation Criteria: We evaluate the performance of error detection based on accuracy
and response time, which are deﬁned as follows:
• Accuracy: This metric is used to evaluate how accurately the algorithm determines the
true mode. Assuming the true mode transition mptq is known for t “ 0, 1, 2, . . . , T , let
m1ptq for t “ 0, 1, 2, . . . , T be the mode determined by the error detection algorithm.
We deﬁne accuracypm,m1q “ 1T
řT
t“0 pptq, where pptq “ 1 if mptq “ m1ptq and pptq “ 0
otherwise.
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• Maximum/Minimum/Average Response Time: This metric is used to evalu-
ate how quickly the algorithm reacts to mode changes. Let a tuple pti,miq repre-
sent a mode change point, where the mode changes to mi at time ti. Let M “
tpt1,m1q, pt2,m2q, . . . , ptN ,mN qu and M 1 “ tpt11,m11q, pt12,m12q, . . . , pt1N 1 ,m1N 1qu be the sets
of true mode changes and detected mode changes respectively. For each i “ 1 . . . N , we
can ﬁnd the smallest t1j such that pti ď t1jq^pmi “ m1jq; if not found, let t1j be ti`1. The re-
sponse time ri for the true modemi is given by t
1
j´ti. We deﬁne the maximum, minimum,
and average response times by max1ďiďN ri, min1ďiďN ri, and 1N
řN
i“1 ri respectively.
Experimental Settings: We run the WeightCheck PILOTS program in Figure 7 for 1500
seconds, which is from 2000 to 3500 seconds after the departure including the ﬁrst (2170–2370
seconds) and the second cruise phase (2960–3450 seconds), to see how the error signature set
works for these two cruise phases. On the other hand, we evaluate only the second cruise phase
since the error signature set is adjusted by the ﬁrst cruise phase. The true mode changes for
the second cruise phase is deﬁned as M “ tp2960, 1qu. The accuracy and average response time
are investigated for window sizes ω P t1, 2, 4, 8, 16u and threshold τ P t0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8u.
Results: Figure 8 shows the transitions of (a) aircraft weights and (b) error and detected
modes when ω “ 1 and τ “ 0.8. As shown in Figure 8(b), the PILOTS program correctly
detects the underweight condition for the ﬁrst cruise phase whereas it detects the underweight
condition well before the second cruise phase starts. This is because the error goes beyond 4.69
(the boundary for the underweight condition) around 2770 seconds. From Figure 8(a), we can
tell that corrected weight is reasonably close to the real weight during the ﬁrst cruise phase,
but is not very close during the second phase. That is, the diﬀerences between the corrected
and real weights are at most -643 kg for the ﬁrst cruise phase and -1935 kg for the second
cruise phase. This corrected weight discrepancy between the two phases can be explained by
inaccuracy of the airspeed estimation during the second cruise phase. This result reveals that
our airspeed prediction model is not accurate enough to precisely estimate the airspeed from
the weight, but nonetheless, it is able to detect the underweight condition.
When we ran the experiments for accuracy and response time, we noticed that the accuracy
was 1.0 and response time was 0 second for all combinations of ω and τ . As explained above, the
PILOTS program recognizes the correct mode (=1, underweight) for the entire second cruise
phase, which makes the accuracy 1.0. Since there is a 190 seconds (=19 window periods) buﬀer
between when the program starts recognizing the underweight condition at 2770 seconds and
when the actual second cruise phase starts at 2960 seconds, changing the window size ω from
1 to 16 does not aﬀect the response time at all. Assuming the ground truth mode for the non
cruise phases is 0 (i.e., normal mode), the accuracy goes down to 0.84 for all mode detection
period (i.e., 2000-3500 seconds).
	
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Figure 8: Aircraft weights and detected modes for the TU1153 ﬂight (ω “ 1, τ “ 0.8).
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4 Related Work
There have been many systems that combine data stream processing and data base manage-
ment, i.e., Data Stream Management Systems (DSMS). PLACE [8] and Microsoft StreamIn-
sight [9] are DSMS-based systems supporting spatio-temporal streams. These DSMS-based
spatio-temporal stream management systems support general continuous queries for multiple
moving objects such as “Find all the cars running within a diameter of X from a point Y in the
past Z time”. Unlike these DSMS-based systems which handle multiple spatio-temporal ob-
jects, a PILOTS program is assumed to be moving and tries to extrapolate data that is relevant
to the current location and time. This approach narrows down the applicability of PILOTS;
however, users can more easily design error signatures to correct data on the ﬂy thanks to the
declarative programming approach.
Fault detection, isolation, and reconﬁguration (FDIR) has been actively studied in the
control community [10]. Mission critical systems, such as nuclear power plants, ﬂight control
systems, and automotive systems, are main application systems of FDIR. FDIR systems 1) gen-
erate a set of values called residuals and determine if a fault has occurred based on residuals,
2) identify the type of the fault, and 3) reconﬁgure the system accordingly. To alleviate the
eﬀect of noise on residuals, robust residual generation techniques, such as a Kalman-ﬁlter based
approach [11], have been used. Since the PILOTS system is a fault-tolerance system that
endures data failures, it is expected PILOTS’ framework has resemblance to FDIR systems.
However, due to PILOTS’ domain-speciﬁc programming language approach, PILOTS users
have the ability to control error conditions more generally through error signatures, which is
not part of the FDIR framework.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Supplementing ﬂight systems with error detection and data correction based on error signatures
can add another layer of (logical) fault-tolerance and therefore make airplane ﬂights safer. With
a few tens of lines of PILOTS programs, a data scientist can test and validate their error
detection models in the form of error signatures. In previous work [3], we showed our error
signature-based approach was able to detect and correct the airspeed sensor failure in the Air
France 447 ﬂight accident. In this paper, an evaluation of the Tuninter 1153 ﬂight accident
illustrates the fuel quantity indicator failure could also have been detected.
Scalability becomes paramount as the number of data streams to be analyzed increases–
e.g., due to the increasing number of sensors in aircraft–and also, as we capture more complex
aircraft failure models as error signatures and damaged aircraft performance proﬁles. Future
work includes exploring distributed computing as a mechanism to scale the performance and
quality (e.g., see [12, 13]) of online (real-time) data analyses. It is also important to investigate
high-level abstractions (e.g., see [14]) that will enable data scientists and engineers to more
easily develop concurrent software to analyze data, and that will facilitate distributed computing
optimizations. Finally, uncertainty quantiﬁcation [15, 16] is an important future direction to
associate conﬁdence to data and error estimations in support of decision making.
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